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ABSTRACT
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights
and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection
through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of
private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An
analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing
precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary
to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of






















Recent research in the development of private credit markets across countries points to an 
important role of institutions, such as legal investor protection and credit bureaus, in supporting 
these markets (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, Japelli and Pagano 2002).  Although this research has 
identified several empirical regularities, it suffers from small samples, weak results, and some 
econometric problems.  This paper greatly expands the available data set on credit institutions to 
cover 129 countries and 25 years of data.  The expansion allows an advance on previous research 
in five directions.   First, the greater country coverage yields statistically more reliable results on 
the role of alternative credit institutions in a cross-section.   Second, the larger sample allows us 
to examine whether different institutions are more effective in countries at different levels of 
economic development and judicial efficiency.   Third, time series data on institutions allow us 
to ask whether these institutions improve over time and/or converge across countries.  Fourth, the 
new data allow us to analyze the consequences of institutional reforms for financial 
development, thereby avoiding some econometric concerns about cross-sectional work.  Fifth, 
the much larger sample allows us to better distinguish the roles of legal origins and culture in 
shaping credit institutions (Stulz and Williamson 2003).          
There are two broad views of what determines how much private credit a financial 
system would extend to firms and individuals.  According to the first, what matters for the 
viability of private credit is the power of creditors.  When lenders can more easily force 
repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of the firm, they are more willing to extend 
credit.  These “power” theories of credit have been formalized by Townsend (1979), Aghion and 
Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998).  According to the second view, what matters 
for lending is information.  When lenders know more about borrowers, their credit history, or 
other lenders to the firm, they are not as concerned about the “lemons” problem of financing   3
non-viable projects, and therefore extend more credit.  These “information” theories of credit 
have been pioneered by Jaffe and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).   
We study the importance of information and power theories of credit in explaining the 
variation in the size of private credit markets around the world using a new data set on private 
credit institutions for 129 countries during the period 1978-2003.  To assess the power theories 
of credit, we construct a measure of legal rights of creditors in these countries, the “creditor 
rights” index first proposed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), for every year during this period.  
The index measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors in different 
jurisdictions, and has been previously interpreted as a measure of creditor power.   To assess the 
information theories of credit, we collect data on the existence of public (i.e., government-
owned) and private credit registries in different countries during the same period.  These 
registries collect information on credit histories and current indebtedness of various borrowers, 
and share it with lenders.   Credit registries exist in many countries, and have been shown to be 
an important factor in determining credit availability (Jappelli and Pagano 2000, 2002, Pagano 
and Jappelli 1993, Sapienza 2002).   
Our initial empirical strategy is to run cross-country regressions that explain the private 
credit to GDP ratio in terms of creditor rights and the presence of registries.  In addition, we take 
advantage of the time series dimension of the data.  First, we ask how stable the institutions of 
credit are over time and whether they converge or diverge among different groups of countries. 
In particular, we test the hypothesis that countries whose laws derive from different legal 
traditions exhibit convergence in their creditor rights scores.  Second, by looking at the changes 
in either creditor rights or the information institutions, we can ask whether these reforms have 
any effect on private credit.   This differences-in-differences approach gets around the concern 
that credit institutions are endogenous, and presents an alternative to instrumental variable 
techniques that have also been criticized (e.g., by Glaeser et al. 2004).       4
Creditor power and information theories are not mutually exclusive.  Both ex ante (and 
interim) better information and ex post stronger creditor rights can contribute to credit market 
development.  Indeed, as suggested by Jappelli and Pagano (2002), these institutions may be 
substitutes: some countries may specialize in information institutions, others in legal systems 
giving power to the creditors.  We explore the substitution hypothesis in some detail.  First, less 
developed countries, with poorly functioning legal systems, might be unable to sustain an 
effective lending channel based on ex post creditor rights, and may depend on information 
sharing for their credit markets to function.   In contrast, richer countries might develop more 
functional systems of bankruptcy, so that creditor power can be particularly important in these 
countries.  We examine the relative importance of information and power theories for countries 
at different levels of development.  
Second, as argued by Djankov et al. (2003a) and Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), countries 
in different legal traditions may specialize in different strategies of social control of business.  
Specifically, common law countries often rely on private contracting, whereas civil law 
countries, and especially French civil law countries, rely on government regulation and 
ownership.  Credit markets present an opportunity to evaluate these predictions, since creditor 
power theories deal with legal creditor rights and their enforcement through courts, whereas 
information theories deal with mandatory information disclosure and often state-owned 
institutions for information sharing.  We further distinguish between private and public credit 
registries, and examine the roles of both creditor rights and these information sharing institutions 
in supporting credit markets in countries from different legal traditions.    
Our results can be briefly summarized.  First, we find a pronounced legal origin effect in 
credit market institutions, with common law countries having sharply higher creditor rights 
scores than French civil law countries.  The latter, in contrast, have a much higher incidence of 
public credit registries than do the former.  Second, we find very little convergence in creditor   5
rights scores, or in information institutions, among legal origins.  At least for these measures of 
legal institutions, the differences persist over the 25 year period.  Third, we find that both the 
creditor rights scores, and the incidence of private credit registries, are higher in the richer than 
in the poorer countries.  Fourth, we find in a cross-section of countries that both better creditor 
rights and the presence of credit registries are associated with a higher ratio of private credit to 
GDP.  In addition, we find that private credit to GDP ratio rises following either improvements 
in creditor rights or the introduction of credit registries.  The confirmation of cross-sectional 
evidence with an analysis of reforms is a significant innovation in this paper.  Fifth, we find that 
creditor rights are particularly important for private credit in the richer countries, whereas credit 
registries matter in the poorer countries.  These results both strengthen and refine earlier 
findings, but also point to a beneficial role of public credit registries in poor French legal origin 
countries – a rare example of an apparently successful state intervention.  
The next section presents our data.  Section III presents the basic results on the effects of 
various institutions on private credit.  Section IV looks at the effects of changes in creditor rights, 
and of the introduction of private and public registries, on private credit.  Section V examines the 
variation in the prevalence of these institutions across countries.  Section VI concludes.  
 
II. The Data 
A. Variable Definitions 
We gather data on 133 countries, comprising every economy with a population over 1.5 
million, except countries in civil conflict or inactive members of the World Bank, such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Cuba and Sudan. Table 1 describes the variables used and their sources.  
The private credit data is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, lines 22d and 
42d, which measure claims on the private sector by commercial banks and other financial 
institutions.  The variable is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  Data are available for all sample   6
economies except Puerto Rico, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uzbekistan. We exclude China, 
since the credit variable includes credit to state-owned enterprises and stands at a staggering 
130% of GDP.  In comparison, the share of private credit to GDP in the United Kingdom is 
136%, in Germany 118%, and in France 87%. This leaves us with a maximum of 129 countries 
in the analysis of private credit. 
The creditor rights index follows that constructed by La Porta et al. (1997), with minor 
differences.  We construct the index as at January for every year between 1978 and 2003, and 
expand their sample from 49 to 133 countries.  The creditor rights index measures four powers of 
secured lenders in bankruptcy.  First, whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, 
when a debtor files for reorganization. Second, whether secured creditors are able to seize their 
collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, in other words whether there is no 
‘automatic stay’ or ‘asset freeze’ imposed by the court.  Third, whether secured creditors are paid 
first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm.  Finally, whether an administrator, and 
not management, is responsible for running the business during the reorganization.  A value of 
one is added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each of these powers to 
secured lenders.  The creditor rights index aggregates the scores and varies between 0 (poor 
creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Our creditor rights data as of 1995 are the same as La Porta et al. (1997) report for over 
90% of the observations. The most significant differences arise from coding different bankruptcy 
procedures.  For India, for example, La Porta et al. code using the reorganization provisions in 
the Companies Act (1956), while we code with respect to the Sick Industrial Companies Act 
(1985), which is more relevant for industrial firms. Australia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are similar.  
In some instances, such as Malaysia and the Netherlands, differences in coding arise because of 
the treatment of the power of the administrator in reorganization. We code that “management 
does not stay” if an administrator is automatically appointed and the debtor does NOT remain in   7
control in the ordinary course of business.  In a few cases, differences derive from the moment at 
which there exist restrictions on entering reorganization.  We code with respect to restrictions “at 
the gate,” i.e., the initial point of entering reorganization.   
In 2003, twenty one countries, including Benin, Chad, Colombia, France, and Tunisia, 
had a score of 0. Nine countries, including Hong Kong (China), Kenya, Lebanon, New Zealand, 
Panama, and the United Kingdom, had a perfect score. The United States has a score of 1, as 
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of bankruptcy, but there are no restrictions on 
entering reorganization, the debtor benefits from the automatic stay on assets, and management 
runs the company during the reorganization process. 
We collect time series data on creditor rights in two stages. We begin with a review of 
bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related laws from 1978 to 2003, identifying all major reforms and 
assessing their impact on the creditor rights index. We then survey local bankruptcy lawyers, 
confirming the dates of reforms and their impact on the creditor rights index.  
We review bankruptcy law and reforms primarily using online legal resources, including 
Foreign Law Guide, LexisNexis database, online library of the International Bar Association, 
European Restructuring and Insolvency Guide, and Asia-Pacific Restructuring and Insolvency 
Guide.
 1 Additional legal resources include Collier International Business Insolvency Guide and 
International Insolvency.
 2   In identifying the number of reforms of bankruptcy law, we exclude 
changes that affect bankruptcy only for financial institutions, state enterprises, or persons.     
Likewise, purely procedural law reforms are not considered.   
We record all reforms to bankruptcy legislation—i.e., reorganization, liquidation, 
foreclosure, and secured transactions laws. Substantive bankruptcy regulations, however, are not 
                                                           
1 Foreign Law Database:  http://www.foreignlawguide.com, International Bar Association: http://www.ibanet.org  The Asia-
Pacific Restructuring and Insolvency Guide 2003/2004: http://www.asianrestructuring.com/  The European Restructuring and 
Insolvency Guide 2002/20003: http://www.europeanrestructuring.com/ 
2 Collier International Business Insolvency Guide published by Matthew Bendar and Company Inc. a member of the Lexis-
Nexis Group. International Insolvency published by Juris Publishing (2002).   8
always contained in the Bankruptcy Law.  Thus, we keep track of reforms of Corporate Law, 
Company Law, Commercial Law, the Civil Code, and other associated laws if such reforms 
affect bankruptcy.  As an example, take Malawi. In 2000, the passage of the Employment Act, a 
law seemingly unrelated to bankruptcy matters, affected the ranking of secured creditors’ claims 
in liquidation. Before the reform, the Companies Act of 1984 ranked secured creditors first. The 
2000 Employment Act ranked claims for wages ahead of secured creditor claims. The reform 
lowered Malawi’s creditor rights index from 3 to 2.  
We survey a total of 440 lawyers from the 133 countries to verify the results of the legal 
review.  We ask our respondents to either confirm or amend our initial findings on the number 
and timing of reforms affecting bankruptcy since 1978. In addition, we verify whether and how 
the reforms impacted the creditor rights variables. In six countries the respondents amended our 
findings, generally to correct the timing of the reform to reflect when it came into force.   
Since 1978, many countries reformed their bankruptcy laws.  By our count, 99 countries 
had at least one reform, and the total number of reforms is 162.  We found evidence that richer 
countries have more reforms, inconsistent with the idea that poorer countries reform more to 
catch up with the richer ones.  However, few reforms affected the La Porta et al. creditor rights 
index. Only 25 countries had changes in their creditor rights index since 1978, with a total of 32 
changes.  The correlation between the 2003 and 1978 creditor rights indices is 0.95.   Appendix 
A lists all bankruptcy law reforms in this sample.  Appendix B reports all changes in creditor 
rights scores.      
We record the presence of public and private credit registries though a survey of banking 
supervisors.  Public credit registries are databases managed by a government agency, usually the 
Central Bank or the Superintendent of Banks, that collect information on the standing of 
borrowers in the financial system and make it available to actual and potential lenders.  In 2003, 
they operated in 71 countries in our sample.  Some, such as the German and Saudi Arabian   9
registries, collect only limited information on outstanding loans of large borrowers, and focus on 
banking supervision.  Others, such as those in Belgium, Ecuador, Malaysia, and Taiwan 
distribute extensive information including on late payments and defaults, demographic data, 
credit inquiries, ratings, and sometimes even the payment of utility bills and court records of the 
company and its owners. 
A private credit bureau is a private firm or non-profit organization that maintains a 
database on the standing of borrowers in the financial system.  Its primary role is to facilitate 
exchange of information among banks and financial institutions.
3   As of 2003, private bureaus 
operated in 55 of our sample countries, including all OECD countries but France. Three 
international firms—Experian, Equifax and TransUnion—either own or are affiliated with half of 
the bureaus in our sample.  Unlike public registries, private bureaus usually gather information 
from non-bank lenders and public sources, distribute more data, and offer a broader range of 
services to lenders.  The New Zealand bureau, for example, offers credit scoring, borrower 
monitoring, fraud detection, debt collection and marketing services.   
For countries that confirmed the presence of a public or private registry, we conducted a 
detailed survey of its structure, laws, and associated rules. The survey was filled by the director 
of the registry or, in cases where the registry is a department of the Central Bank, by the 
department’s head.  To build the time series data, respondents were asked the year in which the 
registry was legally established, as well as the year in which the registry began operations—i.e., 
distributing credit information.  In some cases, the difference is significant. For example, the 
Turkish credit bureau was incorporated in 1995, but did not become operational until 1999, 
following years of negotiating with data providers and developing technology.  The analysis is 
based on the year in which the registry began operations. 
                                                           
3 Credit investigative bureaus and credit reporting firms that do not directly facilitate exchange of information between 
financial institutions exist in many countries, but are not considered here.   10
In addition to laws on the books, the quality of law enforcement is likely to matter.  We 
control for enforcement with a measure of the number of days it takes to enforce a simple debt 
contract.  Data are based on the methodology developed in Djankov et al. (2003b), with one 
change, namely that the current series refer to the time to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 
50% of the country’s GDP per capita as of January 2003. This amounts to about $18,000 in the 
United States, about $12,000 in France and Germany, $6,000 in Korea, and $3,000 in Mexico. 
We expanded the Djankov et al. data set to 133 countries.
4  It takes only 48 days to enforce a 
debt contract in the Netherlands, 50 days in New Zealand, 69 in Singapore, 60 in Japan, and 75 
in Korea. In contrast, it takes 1,459 days to enforce a debt contract in Guatemala, 1,028 in 
Serbia, 1,003 in Slovenia, and 1,390 in Italy.   
We control for each country’s total GDP, as it has been suggested that larger economies 
may have bigger credit markets because of economies of scale in organizing the supporting 
institutions. We also control for growth of GDP, because rapid economic expansion may require 
more credit. The GDP data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (CD-
Rom, January 2004), and like private credit data are not available for many countries in the 
earlier part of our period
5.  
A country’s legal origin has been shown to be an important determinant of both creditor 
rights and private credit (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1999; Beck et al 2003a, b).  There 
are four main legal origins: English, French, German, and Nordic.   The English legal origin 
includes the common law of England, and the colonies to which it spread, including the U.S., 
Australia, and Canada.  The French legal origin includes the civil law of France, of countries 
Napoleon conquered (including Portugal and Spain), and of their former colonies.  The German 
                                                           
4 The correlation between our variable and the Djankov et al. (2003a) measure for the overlapping sample of 88 countries is 
0.84.  
5 Data on the ratio of private credit to GDP are not available for 497 out of 3225 potential observations, mostly the 
transition economies during the communist period.   In these cases, we only use country-years with available private 
credit to GDP ratios in the regressions.     11
legal origin includes the laws of the Germanic countries in Central Europe, but also countries in 
East Asia where the German law was transplanted.  The Nordic legal origin refers to the laws of 
the four Scandinavian countries. 
We use this La Porta et al. classification and add a fifth category: Socialist (transition). 
The countries in this category have inherited Soviet laws: these include 12 countries that 
emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union, plus Mongolia.  We do not apply the Socialist 
category to countries that have gone back to their pre-communist legal systems.  Specifically, the 
Baltic and East European countries reactivated their pre World War II laws after the collapse of 
communism (these laws always stayed on the books, but were not used during the communist 
era), and so we classify them according to the origin of those laws.  Latvia’s laws belonged to the 
German civil law tradition prior to annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940; it reverted back to 
them in 1991.  Lithuania was influenced by French and Dutch law both before its annexation in 
1940 and after independence in 1990.  It is classified as French legal origin. The remaining 
former communist countries in central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia - followed the German 
legal tradition, with the exception of Romania, which followed the French tradition, and Albania, 
which inherited French legal influences via Italy.  These countries as well are assigned to their 
pre-war legal systems
6.     
Finally, it has been argued that religion is an important determinant of credit institutions 
(Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  We record the religion practiced by the largest proportion of the 
population, as recorded in the CIA factbook (December 2003, online edition). 
   
                                                           
6 The former communist countries only began reporting private credit to the IMF during 1989-1991, so the question 
of applicable legal origin during the communist era does not arise.   We should also emphasize that this allocation of 
countries to legal origins is based on their bankruptcy laws, and might be different for other business laws.    12
B. Summary of the Data 
Table 2 presents the data on credit institutions around the world by legal origin.  Panel A 
shows creditor rights, Panel B public registries, Panel C private bureaus, and Panel D the 
combined information sharing variable, defined as a dummy equal to 1 if a country has either a 
public or a private registry.   We present the data at five year intervals between 1978 and 2003. 
Panel A confirms for a much larger sample of countries the finding of La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998) that investor protection through creditor rights varies systematically across legal 
origins, but in particular is higher in common law than in French civil law countries.  This result 
is highly statistically significant, and is as strong in 1978 as in 2003.  The Table also confirms 
the earlier finding that German civil law countries have strong creditor rights and Nordic 
countries weak ones, although not as weak as those of French legal origin countries.   
In addition, Panel A demonstrates that there has been no trend toward greater creditor 
rights over time in any legal origin, with the possible exception of the socialist countries. Indeed, 
there is almost no change in average creditor rights score over time in any legal origin.  This 
implies that there has been NO CONVERGENCE of creditor rights between legal origins: the 
French and common law countries are as far apart in 2003 as in 1978.  The stability of creditor 
rights scores over time, and the absence of convergence across legal origins, is broadly consistent 
with the view that these particular measures of investor protection reflect relatively permanent 
features of the institutional environment, deeply rooted in national legal traditions. 
Panel B presents the results on public registries.  It shows that these registries are more 
common in French and German civil law countries than in Nordic and common law countries.  
In 2003, public registries existed in 76.6 percent of French legal origin countries, 61.1 percent of 
German legal origin countries, a quarter of common law countries, and no Nordic countries.  The 
difference between French and common law countries is statistically significant in 2003, but also 
in every prior year in the Panel.     13
Unlike the results of Panel A, which show no time trend, Panel B shows substantial 
increases in the incidence of public registries in all legal origins but the Nordic.  In 1978, there 
were almost no public registries except in French legal origin countries; by 2003, over half the 
countries in the world had them.   The results of Panels A and B suggest that public registries 
may substitute for creditor rights, at least comparing common law and French civil law countries.  
Panel C reports the results for private credit registries.  They are somewhat more frequent 
in common law countries than in French legal origin countries, and by 2003 universal in Nordic 
countries, but the difference between French and English origins is not statistically significant.   
Like the public registries, private bureaus have become much more common around the world in 
the last 25 years, and the ranking of legal origins is generally preserved.  Panel D shows that 
some kind of an information sharing institution (i.e., public or private) occurs more frequently in 
civil than in common law countries.  As we saw from Panels B and C, however, this is driven by 
public registries rather than private bureaus.     
The bottom line is that there are pronounced legal origin effects in creditor rights and in 
public registries, going in opposite directions. However, creditor rights are extremely stable over 
time, whereas both public and private information sharing institutions are becoming increasingly 
common during the time period 1978-2003. 
Table 3 looks at the same data arranging countries by income level in 1978.  Many 
countries do not have data for GDP per capita in 1978, but the results we report are very similar 
if we use 2003 (or an interim year) per capita income rankings.  Panel A shows that, unlike in the 
La Porta et al. data, richer countries have statistically significantly higher creditor rights scores 
than do poorer countries, and that this is true at all points in time.  Part of this of course is the 
composition effect, as Nordic and German legal origin countries are both rich and have high 
creditor rights, so we need to run regressions to validate this finding.    Panel A also shows that 
in neither the richer nor the poorer countries has there been a change of creditor rights over time.   14
Panel B shows that the poorer countries have a higher incidence of public registries than 
do the richer countries; in contrast, Panel C shows that the richer countries have a much higher 
incidence of private bureaus.  If we divide the countries by both legal origin and income, we find 
that, in 2003, 83.3 percent of the poor French legal origin countries have public credit registries, 
compared to only 26.3 percent of the poor common law countries – a truly striking difference.   
The results of Tables 2 and 3 are suggestive of possible patterns of substitution among 
credit institutions. First, in the domain of information sharing, richer countries rely relatively 
more on private institutions, and poorer countries on public ones.  Second, common law 
countries appear to emphasize the ex post mechanism of creditor power over the ex ante 
mechanism of information sharing, with the reverse holding for civil law countries.  The 
conspicuous exceptions to this tradeoff are the German civil law countries, which have both 
strong creditor rights and extensive information sharing institutions.  Third, looking at the 
information sharing institutions, French legal origin countries specialize in public registries 
relative to countries in other origins.  This specialization is most conspicuous in poor countries. 
Table 4 presents correlations among our variables.  First, it documents a positive 
correlation between the amount of private credit and creditor rights, the existence of private 
credit bureaus, aggregate income, income per capita, and income growth, as well as English, 
German and Nordic legal origins.  Private credit is negatively correlated with French and 
socialist legal origin, as well as with the inefficiency of the legal system as measured by contract 
enforcement days.   Second, Table 4 confirms the suggestion of Table 2 that creditor rights and 
public registries are substitutes, and that public and private registries might be substitutes as well.   
Public registries also appear to be more prevalent in countries with less efficient judicial systems.  
We revisit this evidence on institutional substitution in the next section. 
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III. Cross-Country Determinants of Private Credit 
In this section, we present cross-sectional results on the determinants of private credit to 
GDP ratio in 129 countries in 2003.  We have replicated these results for the cross-sections every 
five years from 1978 to 1998, and the results we report hold in other time periods as well.   
  Before presenting the results, three points should be noted.  First, we try to present the 
results in the simplest and most transparent form.  We have estimated other specifications, 
including various interaction terms, and the conclusions we draw are confirmed.  Second, we 
discuss a number of robustness checks below, and we have tried others.  However, most potential 
control variables are available for only a small subset of countries, so adding them often results 
in cutting the sample by two thirds.  Third, although an argument can be made that both legal 
rules and information sharing institutions are endogenous, we present in Tables 5 and 6 ordinary 
least squares results.  Following La Porta et al. (1997), we have confirmed these results using 
legal origins as instruments, but instrumental variables techniques have significant problems in 
this context, including the fact that both of the key independent variables vary by legal origin.   
In Section V below, we examine some determinants of private credit institutions, including legal 
origins (see Table 8).  
Table 5 examines the effect of creditor rights on private credit in a framework similar to 
La Porta et al. (1997), except using a much larger cross-section of countries (129 versus 39).  
The dependent variable is the average ratio of private credit to GDP, expressed as a percentage, 
computed over 1999-2003.  The creditor rights score is as of 1999.  We use several controls in 
these OLS regressions.  First, as in La Porta et al. (1997), we control for the total GDP on the 
theory that credit markets might require fixed institutional costs to function, which are only paid 
when the total economy is large enough.  Second, also as in La Porta et al. (1997), we control for 
per capita GDP growth, since faster growing economies may have greater demand for credit.  
Third, we use our updated measure of days to enforce a simple contract as a proxy for the   16
efficiency of the legal system.  Presumably, debt contracts are more prevalent in the more 
efficient legal systems.  Fourth, since inflation may devalue the stock of outstanding debt or 
otherwise undermine debt contracting, we control for contemporaneous inflation.   
The first column shows that GDP, GDP per capita growth, and contract enforcement days 
(but not inflation) enter significantly and with theoretically predicted signs.  In particular, the 
objective measure of the quality of courts is a significant predictor of private credit.  Further, 
countries with stronger legal protection of creditors have deeper credit markets (Figure 1).  As 
the creditor rights index rises by 1 (roughly the difference between the French and the German 
legal origins), the private credit to GDP ratio rises by 6 percentage points (or a fifth of the way 
from the French to the German legal origin mean).   As do La Porta et al. (1997), we find support 
for the power theories of debt, in which creditor rights determine the willingness to extend credit. 
However, the results presented here are substantially stronger than those presented by La 
Porta et al. (1997) for a sample of 39 countries as of 1995.  Part of the reason for this is that 
several countries changed their bankruptcy scores between 1995 and 2003 in a way that 
improved the fit.  Yet even if we rerun the La Porta et al. (1997) regression using their 39 
countries but our data as of 1995, we get stronger results than they do, indicating that recoding 
the variables for a few countries, as discussed in Section I,  improves the fit.    
The second column in Table 5 includes legal origins as additional controls.  Except for 
the fact that transition countries have less developed debt markets, there is no significant 
influence of legal origin on private credit beyond that contained in other variables.  In fact, the 
coefficient on the creditor rights index barely changes.  There is no additional information in 
legal origins for the effect of legal rules on private credit markets.    
The next four columns revisit these results for the richer and the poorer countries 
separately.  Note first that the quality of courts measure is only significant for the richer 
countries, which suggests that the legal mechanism enforcing debt contracts is not important in   17
the poorer ones.  Note second that inflation in these specifications exacts an adverse effect on 
debt markets, especially in the richer countries.  Turning to our main results, the evidence makes 
clear that the creditor rights results are driven by the richer countries.  For these countries, both 
contract enforcement days and creditor rights remain significant determinants of private credit 
(with legal origins remaining unimportant).  For the poorer countries, in contrast, the statistical 
significance of these variables disappears.   This result again suggests that the legal mechanism 
of enforcing debt contracts is more important in the richer countries. 
We have examined which components of the creditor rights index are responsible for its 
ability to predict private credit.  We find that the absence of automatic stay on assets and respect 
for the priority of secured creditors matter a great deal. On the other hand, restrictions on 
entering reorganization and mandatory removal of management in bankruptcy are not 
particularly important. This evidence suggests that the power to grab and liquidate collateral by 
secured creditors supports successful debt markets.
7  
We check the robustness of the results in Table 5 in several ways.  First, following 
Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), we replace the overall GDP by population as the scale variable.  
This would make sense if both the benefits and the costs of running institutions rise with per 
capita income.  All of the results we have just described are preserved when we make this 
substitution.  Second, we replace our preferred measure of the efficiency of the judicial system, 
contract enforcement days, with the more conventional GDP per capita.  We find, as in Table 5, 
that countries with higher per capita income have a higher ratio of private credit to GDP, and that 
this result is driven by the rich rather than the poor countries.  The coefficients on other variables 
of interest do not change materially.  Third, instead of dividing countries into rich and poor, we 
divide them according to their ICRG “law and order” score, on the theory that it is the law and 
                                                           
7 In a related vein, Qian and Strahan (2004) find that, in a cross-section of countries, a higher creditor rights index is 
associated with a higher likelihood that bank loans are secured.    18
order environment rather than just development that determines the relevance of specific legal 
rules.  We find, as with per capita income, that creditor rights matter in the high but not in the 
low “law and order” countries.   Fourth, it can be argued that our private credit variable includes 
too much credit to state enterprises.  Accordingly, we replace it by the private bond market 
capitalization measure from Beck et al (2000), which unfortunately is only available for 36 
countries.  Even in this small sample, the creditor rights score is a statistically significant 
predictor of private bond market capitalization.  Fifth, we control individually for a number of 
variables in the regression that might be correlated with the creditor rights score, but also 
influence the development of private credit.  These include the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP, a measure of the importance of state enterprises in the economy, a 
measure of fiscal deficit, several proxies for central bank independence, and several proxies of 
judicial checks and balances.
8  None of these variables change our results.   Finally, we 
considered the possibility that not the creditor rights index itself, but some other aspect of legal 
or regulatory intervention in debt markets correlated with creditor rights, is responsible for credit 
market development.  Specifically, we include several measures of the quality of bank 
supervision assembled by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004).  While some of these variables are 
statistically significant, they do not eliminate the statistical significance of creditor rights. 
In Table 6, we add the three measures of information sharing – the existence of a public 
registry, that of a private bureau, and that of either (information sharing = 1 if either a public 
registry or a private bureau exists in a country) – to the regressions in Table 5.   Like creditor 
rights, these variables are measured as of 1999.  We eliminate legal origins from the 
specifications, since they do not influence private credit holding creditor rights constant.
9  The 
effects of the creditor rights index and of contract enforcement days do not change much at all 
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from the estimates in Table 5 in all six specifications.  In addition, the data show that public 
registries are associated with more private credit, but only in the poorer countries (Figure 2), and 
that private credit bureaus are associated with more private credit in both the poorer ones and the 
overall sample (Figure 3).  When we combine these public and private registries into the 
information sharing variable, it has a statistically significant and quantitatively large effect on 
private credit in both the poorer countries and the overall sample.  
As noted earlier, credit registries vary significantly in their design.  We analyze the extent 
to which particular characteristics of registries are associated with more private credit with a  
detailed survey of the structure, rules, and governing laws of credit registries.  We find that  
registries that distribute a broader range of data and provide legal incentives to ensure quality are 
associated with significantly more private credit.  We identify six characteristics that in the data 
encourage private credit: 1) both positive information, meaning loans outstanding and payment 
history on accounts in good standing, and negative information, meaning defaults and arrears, is 
distributed; 2) data on both firms and individual borrowers is distributed; 3) data from retailers, 
trade creditors, and/or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, is distributed; 4) five or 
more years of historical data is available; 5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1 
percent of income per capita; and 6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data.   
Many of these characteristics might be endogenous, and so we merely note these results, rather 
than interpret them as causal.    
The results in Tables 5 and 6 confirm some of the patterns of institutional substitution 
identified earlier.  Whereas creditor rights and judicial efficiency influence private credit in the 
richer countries, neither public nor private credit registries do.  In contrast, both public and 
private registries benefit private credit in poorer countries.  The data thus suggest that the power 
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mechanism for sustaining credit works in the richer countries, while the information mechanism 
matters in the poorer ones.
10  Moreover, there appears to be a constructive role for government in 
maintaining public credit registries in the poorer countries, where for reasons of cost or 
compliance private credit registries are uncommon (see Table 3).  Table 2 suggests that 
governments in poor French legal origin countries are more likely to play this constructive role.  
These results identify a role for both the power and the information theories of debt, but under 
different circumstances. 
 
IV. An Analysis of Reforms  
Cross-country regressions are often criticized because they may omit important country 
characteristics or because the independent variables are endogenous.  An alternative empirical 
strategy is to look at the change in the private credit to GDP ratio around institutional reforms 
that either change the creditor rights score or introduce a public registry or a private bureau.  We 
do this in two alternative ways recommended by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), and 
report the results in Table 7.  
The first strategy, pursued in Panel A, is to collapse the data.  Specifically, we restrict the 
sample to countries that undertook reforms, and run a cross-sectional regression of the change in 
the average levels of private credit to GDP ratio after versus before the reform on the change in 
institutions.  For concreteness, begin with reforms of creditor rights.  Suppose country i changes 
its creditor rights score in year t.  Let AC (i, before) be the average private credit to GDP ratio of 
the reforming country i taken over the five years before year t, and AC (i, after) be the average 
private credit to GDP ratio in this country in the five years after the reform year t.  Let ∆AC (i) = 
AC (i, after) – AC (i, before) be the change in the average credit to GDP ratio of the reforming 
                                                           
10 An important caveat to this interpretation is that the La Porta et al. index of creditor rights is computed from the 
perspective of secured creditors in bankruptcy, and that this particular measure of investor protection – as opposed   21
country i following the reform.  We are interested in how ∆AC (i) is affected by the change in 
the creditor rights score in country i (occurring in year t), ∆CR (i). 
However, we need to worry that, during the period t-5,…,t,…,t+5, the private credit to 
GDP ratio changed systematically in non-reforming countries as well.  To this end, for each 
country i reforming in year t, consider all countries j = 1,…, J which did not have a creditor 
rights change in the years t-5,…,t,…,t+5, i.e., the whole ten year window around the year t of 
reform in country i.   For each of these countries, compute ∆AC (j) as above, i.e. the change in 
private credit to GDP ratio in the 5 year window around the year t of reform of country i.   
Finally, compute ∆AC (control, i) as the average ∆AC (j) over all the countries j not reforming in 
the window around t.  This ∆AC (control, i) can be computed for every reforming country i, and 
will be used as a control variable.  Obviously, ∆AC (control, i) differs for every year.     
We run on the cross-section of only the countries that actually experienced a change in 
creditor rights score the following ordinary least squares regression: 
  ∆AC (i) = α + β* ∆CR (i) + γ* ∆AC (control, i). 
The coefficient γ captures world trends in private credit to GDP ratio around reform years, while 
the coefficient β captures the effect of a unit change in the creditor rights score on private credit. 
The same regression can be run for 3 year windows around creditor rights score reforms.   
For the public and private registries, the change in institutions – the counterpart of ∆CR 
(i) -- is always equal to one, since we only have the introductions of private bureaus or public 
registries in the data.  Accordingly, we follow the procedures above (including the calculation of 
the corresponding control variables) for introductions of private and public registries (rather than 
changes in creditor rights score), and then run  
∆AC (i) = α + γ* ∆AC (control, i), 
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on the sub-samples of countries introducing registries or bureaus.  The average effect of the 
introduction of an information sharing institution is picked up by the constant term.    
  In the sample, there are only 32 episodes of changes in the creditor rights index (see 
Appendix B).   This result is consistent with the evidence of Tables 2 and 3 of virtually no 
changes in average creditor rights index by income level or by legal origin over the 25 year 
period.  Unfortunately, many of the 32 changes occur in former communist countries close to the 
end of the sample, so we cannot compute the average private credit to GDP ratio five or even 
three years after the reform.  We can only compute changes in the dependent variable for 21 
observations with five year averages, and for 25 with three year averages.
11 
The results, presented in Panel A, show that, for 3 and 5 year windows, a one point 
increase in the creditor rights score raises the ratio of private credit to GDP by between 6.5 and 8 
percentage points.  The result (displayed in Figure 4) is statistically significant, and the estimate 
is quantitatively similar to those in Tables 5 and 6.    The control for the average change in the 
ratio of private credit to GDP among non-reforming countries is not statistically significant.   The 
results also show that, over a 5 year horizon, the private credit to GDP ratio rises after the 
introduction of both public registries and private bureaus by 7 to 8 percentage points.  The 
magnitudes of the effects are smaller than those reported in Table 6, but the results are 
statistically significant.  However, although parameter estimates show a rise in the private credit 
to GDP ratio over a 3 year window around the reform, these results are insignificant.   
Panel B presents the results of an alternative strategy of measuring the effects of reform, 
namely panel regressions.  Here the dependent variable is the ratio of private credit to GDP each 
year in each sample country, but we introduce both country effects and year effects.     
Identification here only takes advantage of within country variation in institutional variables.   A 
                                                           
11 In a recent paper, Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2005) focus specifically on transition economies to examine the 
effects of changes in creditor protections on bank lending.  Their conclusions are broadly consistent with ours.    23
key question in this specification is what standard errors to compute.   One possibility is to 
compute robust standard errors.  This strategy does not take account of possible serial correlation 
of error terms within each country.  Another possibility is to cluster standard errors by country, 
as recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004), which imposes no restrictions on the possible serial 
correlation of error terms.   With many time series observations (recall we have 25 years of data), 
such a specification may blow up standard errors excessively.
12  Since both strategies have 
problems, we present both standard errors in Table 7B.  
These panel results yield lower parameter estimates than the findings from the cross-
sections in Tables 5 and 6 as well as those in Panel A (a 4 percentage point rise in the private 
credit to GDP ratio per one point improvement in the creditor rights score).   The effect is 
statistically significant for both all and the rich countries using robust standard errors, but only 
for the rich countries (at the 10 percent level) using standard errors clustered by country.  The 
effects of private bureaus and of public registries remain of the same magnitude as in the earlier 
specifications, although again standard errors rise sharply when clustered by country.   The 
evidence on the information sharing institutions confirms the previous findings; the evidence on 
creditor rights is weaker both in magnitude and in statistical significance.    
  Except for the large standard errors clustered by country, the results for reforms, 
including those from Panel A, support the findings from the cross-section. Both the power and 
the information channel of credit play a role, and improvements in either channel raise the ratio 
of private credit to GDP.  We recognize that the results in this section are subject to the criticism 
that the timing of reforms is endogenous, and in particular may occur when policy makers expect 
private credit to grow.  Still, the consistency of results across methodologies is encouraging. 
 
                                                           
12 In a conversation, James Stock suggests that while clustering of standard errors has a modest impact for 3 to 5 
year panels, it often blows up standard errors for longer panels (e.g., 20 years) by a factor of 2 to 3.   24
V. Determinants of Credit Institutions  
We have shown that credit institutions have a significant effect on credit market 
development.  But what shapes these institutions?  We have already seen in Tables 2 and 3 that 
the level of economic development and legal origin are potentially important determinants of 
which countries have which institutions.  In a recent paper, Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
emphasize that culture is an important determinant of creditor rights.   Using the La Porta et al. 
(1997) sample, they find that creditor rights are weaker in catholic countries, and that holding 
religious composition constant, legal origin does not help predict creditor rights.   
Table 8 revisits some of these issues, looking at the potential determinants of creditor 
rights, public registries, and private bureaus using our larger 2003 sample.   With respect to  
creditor rights, the first column shows that French legal origin countries have sharply weaker  
rights than the (omitted) common law category without controlling for religion.  The second 
column shows that, consistent with Stulz and Williamson (2003), protestant countries have 
statistically significantly stronger creditor rights than others, without controlling for legal origin.   
However, when we put legal origin and religious orientation together in the regression, as we do 
in columns 3 and 4, religious variables are no longer significant.  We also could not get religion 
to matter when we construct the more complex variables suggested by Stulz and Williamson. 
The two additional panels in Table 8 examine the determinants of the presence of public 
registries and private bureaus.  French and German legal origin countries are more likely to have 
public credit registries than their common law counterparts, and transition countries are less 
likely to have private credit bureaus than the common law countries.  Richer countries as well 
are more likely to have private credit bureaus.  Protestant countries are less likely to have public 
credit registries than others, but the result loses its significance once we control for legal origin.  
There is no difference between catholic and protestant countries in the incidence of private credit   25
bureaus, although muslim and orthodox countries are less likely to have them.  In this sample, 
legal origin appears to matter more for credit institutions than culture.  
The result that French legal origins predicts the presence of public credit registries, which 
in turn benefit credit markets in poorer countries, is consistent with the argument of Djankov et 
al. (2003a) that public ownership and regulation represent solutions to the problem of disorder 
practiced especially by French civil law countries.   Research on the regulation of entry, civil 
procedure, bank ownership, and the regulation of labor markets has not, however, been able to 
identify any benefits of this approach to social control of business in developing countries.   
Perhaps because public registries neither employ significant numbers of people nor can be easily 
used to discriminate among borrowers for political reasons, they appear to be beneficial.   This 
evidence, then, illustrates a successful public ownership solution to the problem of supporting 
credit markets in developing countries.        
 
VI. Conclusion   
Using a new sample of credit institutions in 129 countries over 25 years, we revisit some 
old and establish some new results on private credit around the world.  First, in this large sample, 
both the cross-sectional evidence and the analysis of reforms show that legal creditor rights and 
information sharing institutions are statistically significant and quantitatively important 
determinants of private credit development.  Second, there is no evidence the creditor rights are 
converging among legal origins, or among rich and poor countries.  This evidence contradicts the 
legal convergence hypothesis which holds that institutions converge toward the more successful 
ones over time.  Since credit institutions vary so much across countries and legal origins, and 
since these differences matter for the development of debt markets, this evidence also contradicts 
the “functional convergence” hypothesis, which holds that institutions in different countries, 
while distinct on the surface, functionally converge to accomplish the same goals.     26
Third, the data show that the effectiveness of alternative institutions varies systematically 
across countries at different levels of economic development.  Most interestingly, both private 
and public credit bureaus are strongly associated with private credit in the poorer, but not the 
richer, countries, suggesting a role for government in facilitating information sharing.
13  Since 
public credit registries are especially common in French legal origin countries, these results 
highlight a successful civil law response to financial underdevelopment.  Such successes have 
been difficult to identify in other domains of social control of business.  These results suggest 
that the choice between common and civil law approaches to solving economic problems is a 
matter of comparative advantage of alternative strategies of social control and not just of the 
absolute advantage of common law solutions.  
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Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta and others (1998).  A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights 
of secured lenders are defined in laws and regulations:  First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a 
debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, 
i.e. there is no "automatic stay" or "asset freeze."  Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, 
as opposed to other creditors such as government or workers.  Finally, if management does not retain administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization.   The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003.  
Public registry The variable equals 1 if a public credit registry operates in the country, 0 otherwise.  A public registry is defined as a database owned by 
public authorities (usually the Central Bank or Banking Supervisory Authority), that collects information on the standing of borrowers in 
the financial system and makes it available to financial institutions.  The variable is constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 
2003.
Private bureau The variable equals 1 if a private credit bureau operates in the country, 0 otherwise.  A private bureau is defined as a private commercial 
firm or non profit organization that maintains a database on the standing of borrowers in the financial system, and its primary role is to 
facilitate exchange of information amongst banks and financial institutions.  Private credit reporting firms, which collect information from 
public sources but not banks and financial institutions, operate in several other countries but are not considered here.  The variable is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003.
Information sharing The variable equals 1 if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country, 0 otherwise, and is constructed as at January 
for every year from 1978 to 2003.
Private Credit to GDP Ratio of credit from deposit taking financial institutions to the private sector (IFS lines 22d and 42d) to GDP (IFS line 99b),expressed as a 
percentage.  Line 22d measures claims on the private sector by commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept 
transferable deposits such as demand deposits.  Line 42d measures claims on the private sector given by other financial institutions that 
do not accept transferable deposits but that perform financial intermediation by accepting other types of deposits or close substitutes for 
deposits (e.g. savings and mortgage institutions, post office savings institutions, building and loan associations, certain finance 
companies, development banks and offshore banking institutions).   Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics September 2004.
GDP Logarithm of gross national income (current U.S. Dollars), average 2001-2003.  Source:  World Development Indicators 2004.
GDP per capita Logarithm of gross national income per capita (Atlas method), 2003. Source:  World Development Indicators 2004.
GDP per capita growth Average annual growth in gross domestic product per capita from 1979 - 2003.  Source:  World Development Indicators 2004.
Inflation Annual percentage inflation, GDP deflator, average 1999-2003.  Source:  World Development Indicators 2004.
Contract enforcement days The number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. The data are based on the methodology in Djankov and others (2003) 
but describe the number of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country's GDP per capita.  The variable 
is constructed as at January 2003.
Legal origin A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or Commercial Code of each country.  The five origins are English, 
French, German, Nordic and Socialist.  Source:  La Porta and others (1999) and the CIA Factbook 2003.
Religion A dummy variable that identifies the religion practiced by the largest proportion of the population.  There are nine religions:  Athiest, 
Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Indigenous, Judaism, Muslim, Orthodox Christian and Protestant.  Source:  Stulz and Williamson (2003) and 
the CIA Factbook 2003.
Table 1:  Description of the Variables
This table presents the variables used in the regression analysis. The Creditor rights variable updates La Porta and others (1998) and refines the collection methodology. 
The Public registry and Private bureau variables are newly-collected data. The variable Information sharing is a discrete variable, which aggregates data from the Public 
Registry and Private bureau variables. The variable Private credit to GDP comes from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. GDP and inflation data come from the 
World Bank. The data for contract enforcement days is based on the methodology in Djankov and others (2003). The variable Legal origin comes from La Porta and 
others (1999) and is updated with the CIA Factbook  (2003). The variable Religion comes from Stulz and Willaimson (2003) and is updated with the CIA Factbook  (2003). 
All variables are constructed as of January for every year from 1978 to 2003.Legal Origin 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
English 2.417 2.417 2.444 2.361 2.333 2.278
French 1.311 1.311 1.311 1.328 1.297 1.313
German 2.429 2.429 2.429 2.143 2.333 2.333
Nordic 2.250 2.250 2.500 2.000 1.750 1.750
Socialist . . . 2.000 2.273 2.182
All 1.787 1.787 1.806 1.774 1.812 1.797
T-Test, English vs French 4.644 a 4.644 a 4.719 a 4.298 a 4.364 a 4.039 a
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Legal Origin 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
English 0.028 0.056 0.111 0.222 0.250 0.250
French 0.422 0.469 0.500 0.531 0.719 0.766
German 0.056 0.056 0.111 0.167 0.333 0.611
Nordic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Socialist 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.182
All 0.218 0.248 0.286 0.338 0.474 0.534
T-Test, English vs French -4.599 a -4.650 a -4.179 a -3.119 a -5.020 a -5.738 a
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Legal Origin 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
English 0.139 0.222 0.222 0.361 0.417 0.500
French 0.141 0.156 0.188 0.266 0.344 0.359
German 0.222 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.389 0.556
Nordic 0.750 0.750 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Socialist 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
All 0.158 0.195 0.218 0.293 0.361 0.414
T-Test, English vs French -0.024 0.819 0.413 0.995 0.720 1.372
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Legal Origin 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
English 0.167 0.278 0.333 0.556 0.639 0.694
French 0.531 0.578 0.625 0.688 0.844 0.906
German 0.222 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.556 0.944
Nordic 0.750 0.750 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Socialist 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.182
All 0.353 0.414 0.459 0.549 0.699 0.797
T-Test, English vs French -3.786 a -2.987 a -2.890 a -1.318 -2.379 b -2.783 a
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
D. Information Sharing
Table 2:  Credit Institutions by Legal Origin
A.  Creditor Rights
B. Public Registry
C. Private Bureau
This table presents the means of the Creditor rights, Public registry, Private bureau and Information sharing variables at five 
year intervals between 1978 and 2003. The data are shown by legal origin and T-tests on the differences between English and 
French legal origins are provided. The analysis covers 129 countries.Income Group 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Poor 1.490 1.490 1.490 1.469 1.408 1.367
Rich 2.106 2.106 2.149 2.042 2.020 2.020
Missing 1978 GDP data 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.852 2.088 2.088
All 1.787 1.787 1.806 1.774 1.812 1.797
T-Test, Rich vs Poor -2.561 a -2.561 a -2.702 a -2.354 b -2.582 a -2.801 a
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Income Group 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Poor 0.367 0.388 0.429 0.510 0.633 0.653
Rich 0.180 0.240 0.300 0.360 0.420 0.440
Missing 1978 GDP data 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.324 0.500
All 0.218 0.248 0.286 0.338 0.474 0.534
T-Test, Rich vs Poor 2.119 b 1.589 1.328 1.510 2.146 b 2.157 b
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Income Group 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Poor 0.020 0.020 0.041 0.102 0.184 0.224
Rich 0.400 0.500 0.540 0.660 0.760 0.800
Missing 1978 GDP data 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.118
All 0.158 0.195 0.218 0.293 0.361 0.414
T-Test, Rich vs Poor -5.162 a -6.400 a -6.459 a -6.897 a -6.958 a -6.935 a
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Income Group 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Poor 0.388 0.408 0.469 0.592 0.755 0.796
Rich 0.520 0.660 0.720 0.820 0.880 0.940
Missing 1978 GDP data 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.088 0.353 0.588
All 0.353 0.414 0.459 0.549 0.699 0.797
T-Test, Rich vs Poor -1.319 -2.570 a -2.601 a -2.550 a -1.616 c -2.150 b
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
D. Information Sharing
Table 3:  Credit Institutions by Income Group in 1978
A.  Creditor Rights
B. Public Registries
C. Private Bureaus
This table presents the means of the Creditor rights, Public registry, Private bureau and Information sharing variables at five 
year intervals between 1978 and 2003. The data are shown by income group at the beginning of the sample period (1978). The 
sample is split into two, with rich countries having income per capita above the median value and poor countries having 
income per capita below the median value. T-tests on the differences between rich and poor countries are provided. The 

















































































































































































































































































Creditor rights 0.299 a
(0.001)
Public registry -0.164 c -0.219 a
(0.063) (0.011)
Private bureau 0.599 a 0.163 c -0.286 a
(0.000) (0.061) (0.001)
Information sharing 0.357 a -0.106 0.540 a 0.424 a
(0.000) (0.224) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.686 a 0.150 c -0.123 0.555 a 0.291 a
(0.000) (0.086) (0.158) (0.000) (0.001)
GDP per capita growth 0.341 a 0.080 -0.082 0.337 a 0.244 a 0.272 a
(0.000) (0.357) (0.347) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002)
Contract enforcement days -0.457 a -0.130 0.260 a -0.222 a -0.040 -0.279 a -0.166 c
(0.000) (0.137) (0.003) (0.010) (0.649) (0.001) (0.057)
English legal origin 0.154 c 0.256 a -0.347 a 0.107 -0.155 c 0.065 0.041 -0.124
(0.081) (0.003) (0.000) (0.220) (0.074) (0.456) (0.640) (0.155)
French legal origin -0.208 b -0.409 a 0.447 a -0.106 0.262 a -0.162 c -0.163 c 0.218 a -0.587 a
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.225) (0.002) (0.062) (0.061) (0.012) (0.000)
German legal origin 0.193 b 0.186 b 0.061 0.114 0.145 c 0.213 a 0.347 a -0.022 -0.241 a -0.381 a
(0.029) (0.032) (0.483) (0.191) (0.096) (0.014) (0.000) (0.803) (0.005) (0.000)
Nordic legal origin 0.184 b -0.007 -0.188 b 0.210 b 0.089 0.165 c 0.058 -0.236 a -0.107 -0.170 b -0.070
(0.037) (0.934) (0.030) (0.015) (0.309) (0.058) (0.509) (0.006) (0.219) (0.051) (0.426)
Socialist legal origin -0.227 a 0.101 -0.212 a -0.252 a -0.459 a -0.177 b -0.237 a -0.022 -0.183 b -0.289 a -0.119 -0.053
(0.010) (0.247) (0.014) (0.003) (0.000) (0.042) (0.006) (0.802) (0.035) (0.001) (0.173) (0.546)
GDP per capita 0.715 a 0.239 a -0.144 c 0.573 a 0.303 a 0.729 a 0.222 a -0.327 a -0.039 -0.151 c 0.298 a 0.237 a -0.180 b
(0.000) (0.006) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.655) (0.082) (0.000) (0.006) (0.039)
Catholic 0.104 -0.120 0.148 c 0.284 a 0.222 a 0.156 c -0.076 0.126 -0.305 a 0.382 a 0.062 -0.120 -0.204 b 0.223 a
(0.241) (0.169) (0.088) (0.001) (0.010) (0.073) (0.383) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.170) (0.019) (0.010)
Protestant 0.214 a 0.204 b -0.351 a 0.224 a -0.061 0.123 -0.019 -0.308 a 0.380 a -0.393 a -0.036 0.431 a -0.123 0.129 -0.277 a
(0.015) (0.018) (0.000) (0.009) (0.485) (0.157) (0.827) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.682) (0.000) (0.160) (0.140) (0.001) .
Muslim -0.184 b -0.070 0.128 -0.340 a -0.155 c -0.181 b -0.026 0.132 0.048 0.091 -0.192 b -0.107 0.063 -0.266 a -0.414 a -0.249 a
(0.036) (0.427) (0.141) (0.000) (0.074) (0.037) (0.766) (0.129) (0.585) (0.299) (0.027) (0.219) (0.473) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) .
Buddhist 0.136 0.026 -0.076 0.108 0.073 0.072 0.273 a -0.178 b 0.019 -0.103 0.137 -0.050 0.018 0.003 -0.194 b -0.116 -0.174 b
(0.125) (0.769) (0.381) (0.216) (0.404) (0.409) (0.001) (0.041) (0.830) (0.236) (0.115) (0.566) (0.838) (0.974) (0.025) (0.182) (0.046)
Note:  p-values are in parentheses; a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Table 4:  Correlations
This table presents Bonferroni-adjusted simple correlations between all explanatory variables used in the analysis. The definition of each variable is shown in Table 1. The analysis covers 129 countries.Independent Variables
GDP 10.816 a 10.376 a 4.464 a 4.716 a 12.109 a 11.709 a
(1.254) (1.277) (1.170) (1.071) (2.073) (2.185)
GDP per capita growth 1.976 c 1.593 0.816 a 0.283 4.924 b 4.968 b
(1.081) (1.068) (0.263) (0.821) (2.389) (2.420)
Contract enforcement days -14.721 a -15.143 a -1.713 -7.497 -8.847 b -8.289 b
(3.249) (3.379) (5.573) (5.365) (3.642) (3.858)
Inflation -0.093 -0.088 c -0.054 b -0.052 b -1.626 a -1.673 a
(0.061) (0.053) (0.025) (0.023) (0.285) (0.333)
Creditor rights 5.841 a 6.413 a 0.768 2.399 c 10.647 a 9.936 a
(2.070) (2.472) (1.270) (1.452) (2.963) (3.410)
French legal origin -0.451 0.000 8.305 c -9.466
(6.113) (4.710) (8.372)
German legal origin -1.351 14.099 -18.204 c
(9.571) (16.977) (10.373)
Nordic legal origin 4.467 (dropped) -8.950
(9.530) (10.425)
Socialist legal origin -19.409 a -5.941 -10.438
(6.648) (4.024) (10.755)
Constant -142.240 a -128.197 a -72.050 c -49.519 -209.700 a -192.053 a
(36.014) (37.867) (40.025) (38.442) (56.062) (60.603)
Obs 129 129 65 65 64 64
R-sq 0.6003 0.6155 0.2622 0.3399 0.6608 0.6823
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Table 5:  Private Credit to GDP Regressions
Dependent Variable:  Private Credit to GDP
All Countries Poor Countries Rich Countries
This table presents cross-section OLS regressions, using a sample of 129 countries. The dependent variable is Private Credit to 
GDP, averaged over the 1999-2003 period. Results are shown separately for poor and rich countries. Poor countries are countries 
with income per capita below the sample's median. Rich countries are countries with income per capita above the sample's median. 
Four controls are used in the analysis: total GDP, per-capita income growth, a proxy for the efficiency of the legal system, and 
inflation. The Inflation variable is averaged over the 1999-2003 period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.Independent Variables
GDP 9.751 a 8.401 a 3.945 a 3.686 a 11.712 a 11.368 a
(1.262) (1.403) (1.014) (1.179) (2.222) (2.382)
GDP per capita growth 2.203 b 1.921 b 1.015 a 1.050 a 5.002 b 4.499 c
(0.999) (0.928) (0.247) (0.224) (2.474) (2.513)
Contract enforcement days -15.014 a -14.680 a -4.476 -4.029 -8.873 b -9.065 b
(3.170) (2.994) (5.428) (5.287) (3.538) (3.603)
Inflation -0.071 -0.064 -0.039 -0.037 -1.564 a -1.514 a
(0.070) (0.058) (0.035) (0.032) (0.292) (0.304)
Creditor rights 6.988 a 6.112 a 2.272 c 2.154 c 10.571 a 10.623 a
(2.116) (2.139) (1.328) (1.272) (2.985) (3.021)
Information sharing  17.000 a 10.861 a 7.183
(4.713) (3.284) (7.292)
Private bureau 20.788 a 14.238 b 7.401
(6.225) (5.892) (7.131)
Public registry 7.218 9.926 a -0.095
(4.588) (3.616) (6.696)
Constant -129.954 a -96.666 a -53.507 -50.473 -205.707 a -194.169 a
(35.429) (38.764) (37.678) (34.995) (57.949) (64.304)
Obs 129 129 65 65 64 64
R-sq 0.6323 0.6463 0.3536 0.391 0.6646 0.6658
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Table 6:  Private Credit to GDP Regressions, with Information Sharing
Dependent Variable:  Private Credit to GDP
All Countries Poor Countries Rich Countries
This table presents cross-section OLS regressions, using a sample of 129 countries. The dependent variable is Private Credit to 
GDP, averaged over the 1999-2003 period. Results are shown separately for poor and rich countries. Poor countries are countries 
with income per capita below the sample's median. Rich countries are countries with income per capita above the sample's median. 
Private bureaus and public registries established after 1999 are classified as 0 in the Private bureau and Public registry variables. 
Information sharing is a discrete variable equal to 1 is either a private bureau or a public registry exists, 0 otherwise. Four controls are 
used in the analysis: total GDP, per-capita income growth, a proxy for the efficiency of the legal system, and inflation. The Inflation 
variable is averaged over the 1999-2003 period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
         
 
  Independent variables
Creditor rights 4.303 3.870 0.191 -0.144 8.155 7.429
(robust standard errors) (1.448) a (1.354) a (1.600) (1.522) (1.809) a (1.832) a
(errors clustered by country) (3.732) (3.447) (2.459) (2.188) (4.749) c (4.833)
Private bureau 8.047 4.579 8.047 6.548 4.018 2.220
(1.482) a (1.516) a (1.361) a (1.349) a (1.949) b (2.005)
(3.705) b (3.753) (3.530) b (3.564) c (4.907) (4.962)
Public registry 1.348 1.273 8.389 7.782 -5.164 -4.158
(1.073) (1.039) (0.979) a (0.943) a (1.840) a (1.858) b
(3.423) (3.140) (2.722) a (2.605) a (5.988) (5.885)
Inflation -0.026 -0.009 -0.094 -0.091 0.319 0.416
(0.056) a (0.063) a (0.029) a (0.028) a (0.234) (0.271)
(0.056) (0.063) (0.029) b (0.028) b (0.234) (0.271)
GDP 13.616 5.858 13.229
(0.949) a (0.934) a (1.857) a
(2.869) a (2.216) a (6.073) b
Constant 18.783 -292.346 -2.243 -125.331 94.891 -313.983
(7.383) a (19.635) a (1.414) (24.113) a (9.046) a (38.719) a
(12.835) (58.824) a (2.383) (57.919) a (22.556) a (125.366) a
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2660 2645 1285 1277 1375 1368
R-squared 0.8579 0.8697 0.7317 0.7439 0.8370 0.8440
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors (second row) and standard errors clustered by country (third row) in parentheses
B. Panel Regressions
Rich Countries Poor Countries All countries
Dependent Variable: Annual Private Credit to GDP (1978 - 2003)Independent Variables
GDP per capita 0.364 b 0.337 b 0.356 b 0.377 b -0.120 b -0.079 -0.115 b -0.091 0.415 a 0.409 a 0.413 a 0.359 a
(0.148) (0.141) (0.149) (0.157) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.067) (0.049) (0.042) (0.049) (0.054)
French legal origin -0.951 a -0.833 a -0.801 a 0.506 a 0.422 a 0.448 a -0.107 -0.074 -0.143
(0.230) (0.243) (0.272) (0.092) (0.116) (0.118) (0.086) (0.096) (0.088)
German legal origin -0.151 -0.065 -0.007 0.429 a 0.369 b 0.395 a -0.180 -0.157 -0.205
(0.272) (0.267) (0.274) (0.138) (0.156) (0.155) (0.126) (0.133) (0.137)
Nordic legal origin -0.987 b -1.187 b -1.202 b -0.098 0.044 0.021 -0.024 -0.079 -0.025
(0.494) (0.544) (0.552) (0.099) (0.093) (0.097) (0.093) (0.112) (0.113)
Transition legal origin 0.020 0.136 0.298 -0.107 -0.189 -0.207 -0.367 a -0.336 a -0.240 b
(0.225) (0.238) (0.286) (0.143) (0.160) (0.198) (0.078) (0.087) (0.104)
Protestant 0.543 c 0.328 0.371 -0.469 a -0.232 c -0.166 0.154 0.090 -0.093
(0.291) (0.330) (0.393) (0.090) (0.123) (0.143) (0.104) (0.132) (0.139)
Buddhist -0.038 -0.082 0.020
(0.283) (0.181) (0.116)
Muslim 0.045 0.118 -0.321 a
(0.286) (0.122) (0.099)
Orthodox -0.208 0.117 -0.359 a
(0.269) (0.183) (0.124)
Other religion 0.169 0.120 -0.210 b
(0.348) (0.111) (0.099)
Constant 1.095 b 0.601 1.000 b 0.879 0.642 a 0.862 a 0.709 a 0.558 b -0.850 a -0.958 a -0.876 a -0.501 b
(0.505) (0.471) (0.508) (0.630) (0.215) (0.191) (0.222) (0.284) (0.174) (0.127) (0.166) (0.216)
Obs 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133
R-Sq 0.2191 0.0842 0.2253 0.2295 0.2936 0.1351 0.3099 0.3247 0.4094 0.3814 0.4119 0.4824
Note:  a=significant at the 1% level, b=significant at the 5% level, c=significant at the 10% level
Dependent Variable:  Creditor Rights Dependent Variable:  Public Registry Dependent Variable:  Private Bureau
Table 8: Determinants of Credit Institutions
This table presents OLS regressions for the year 2003, using a sample of 133 countries that have data on credit institutions. The legal origin variables come from La Porta et al (1999) and are 
updated with CIA Factbook (2003). The religion variables come from Stulz and Williamson (2003) and are updated with CIA Factbook (2003). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Country












Albania 0.06 3 0 0 0 340 French Muslim
Algeria 0.06 1 0 0 0 407 French Muslim
Angola 0.04 3 1 1 0 1011 French Indigenous
Argentina 0.19 1 1 1 1 520 French Catholic
Armenia 0.08 2 0 0 0 195 Socialist Orthodox
Australia 0.88 3 1 0 1 157 English Protestant
Austria 1.04 3 1 1 1 374 German Catholic
Azerbaijan 0.05 3 0 0 0 267 Socialist Muslim
Bangladesh 0.26 2 1 1 0 365 English Muslim
Belarus 0.09 2 1 1 0 250 Socialist Orthodox
Belgium 0.78 2 1 1 0 112 French Catholic
Benin 0.12 0 1 1 0 570 French Indigenous
Bolivia 0.56 2 1 1 1 591 French Catholic
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.39 3 1 0 1 330 German Muslim
Botswana 0.18 3 1 0 1 154 English Indigenous
Brazil 0.35 1 1 1 1 566 French Catholic
Bulgaria 0.16 2 1 1 0 440 German Orthodox
Burkina Faso 0.12 0 1 1 0 458 French Muslim
Burundi 0.21 1 1 1 0 512 French Catholic
Cambodia 0.07 2 0 0 0 401 French Buddhist
Cameroon 0.09 0 1 1 0 585 French Indigenous
Canada 0.81 1 1 0 1 346 English Catholic
Central African Republic 0.05 0 1 1 0 660 French Indigenous
Chad 0.04 0 1 1 0 526 French Muslim
Chile 0.61 2 1 1 1 305 French Catholic
China . 2 1 1 0 241 German Athiest
Colombia 0.27 0 1 0 1 363 French Catholic
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.01 1 0 0 0 909 French Catholic
Congo, Rep. 0.05 0 1 1 0 560 French Catholic
Costa Rica 0.27 1 1 1 1 550 French Catholic
Cote d'Ivoire 0.14 0 1 1 0 525 French Muslim
Croatia 0.44 3 0 0 0 415 German Catholic
Czech Republic 0.42 3 1 1 1 300 German Athiest
Denmark 1.23 3 1 0 1 83 Nordic Protestant
Dominican Republic 0.38 2 1 1 1 580 French Catholic
Ecuador 0.27 0 1 1 0 388 French Catholic
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.61 2 1 1 0 410 French Muslim
El Salvador 0.05 3 1 1 1 275 French Catholic
Ethiopia 0.28 3 0 0 0 420 English Muslim
Finland 0.58 1 1 0 1 240 Nordic Protestant
France 0.87 0 1 1 0 75 French Catholic
Georgia 0.08 2 0 0 0 375 Socialist Orthodox
Germany 1.18 3 1 1 1 184 German Protestant
Ghana 0.12 1 1 0 1 200 English Protestant
Greece 0.6 1 1 0 1 151 French Orthodox
Guatemala 0.2 1 1 0 1 1459 French Catholic
Guinea 0.04 0 1 1 0 306 French Muslim
Haiti 0.16 2 1 1 0 368 French Catholic
Honduras 0.41 2 1 1 0 545 French Catholic
Hong Kong, China 1.54 4 1 0 1 211 English Indigenous
Hungary 0.34 1 1 0 1 365 German Catholic
India 0.3 2 0 0 0 425 English Hindu
Indonesia 0.2 2 1 1 0 570 French Muslim
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.31 2 1 1 0 545 English Muslim
Ireland 1.1 1 1 0 1 217 English Catholic
Israel 0.89 3 1 0 1 585 English Judaism
Italy 0.79 2 1 1 1 1390 French Catholic
Jamaica 0.22 2 0 0 0 202 English Protestant
Japan 1.07 2 1 0 1 60 German Buddhist
Jordan 0.74 1 1 1 0 342 French Muslim
Kazakhstan 0.15 2 0 0 0 400 Socialist Muslim
Kenya 0.26 4 1 0 1 360 English Protestant
Korea, Rep. 0.93 3 1 0 1 75 German Buddhist
Kuwait 0.68 3 1 0 1 390 French Muslim
Kyrgyz Republic 0.04 3 0 0 0 492 Socialist Muslim
Appendix A:  Data
This table presents new data on Creditor rights, Information sharing, Public registry and Private bureau, collected for the purposes of this study. Information sharing is a 
discrete variable equal to 1 is either a private bureau or a public registry exists, 0 otherwise. The variable Private Credit to GDP is based on the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics. The variable Contract enforcement days is based on teh methodology developed in Djankov and others (2003) and is updated for teh purposes of this study. The 
legal origin variables come from La Porta et al (1999) and are updated with CIA Factbook  (2003). The religion variables come from Stulz and Williamson (2003) and are 
updated with CIA Factbook  (2003).   Country












Lao PDR 0.07 0 1 1 0 443 French Buddhist
Latvia 0.23 3 1 1 0 189 German Protestant
Lebanon 0.84 4 1 1 0 721 French Muslim
Lesotho 0.13 1 0 0 0 285 English Protestant
Lithuania 0.14 2 1 1 0 154 French Catholic
Macedonia, FYR 0.19 3 1 1 0 509 German Orthodox
Madagascar 0.08 2 1 1 0 280 French Indigenous
Malawi 0.08 2 0 0 0 277 English Protestant
Malaysia 1.38 3 1 1 1 300 English Muslim
Mali 0.17 0 1 1 0 340 French Muslim
Mauritania 0.28 1 1 1 0 410 French Muslim
Mexico 0.18 0 1 0 1 421 French Catholic
Moldova 0.15 2 0 0 0 280 Socialist Orthodox
Mongolia 0.16 2 1 1 0 314 Socialist Buddhist
Morocco 0.55 1 1 1 0 240 French Muslim
Mozambique 0.09 2 1 1 0 580 French Indigenous
Namibia 0.47 2 1 0 1 270 English Protestant
Nepal 0.29 2 1 1 0 350 English Hindu
Netherlands 1.42 3 1 0 1 48 French Catholic
New Zealand 1.17 4 1 0 1 50 English Protestant
Nicaragua 0.27 4 1 1 0 155 French Catholic
Niger 0.05 0 1 1 0 330 French Muslim
Nigeria 0.15 4 1 1 0 730 English Muslim
Norway 0.83 2 1 0 1 87 Nordic Protestant
Oman 0.4 0 0 0 0 455 French Muslim
Pakistan 0.28 1 1 1 1 395 English Muslim
Panama 0.92 4 1 0 1 355 French Catholic
Papua New Guinea 0.15 1 0 0 0 295 English Indigenous
Paraguay 0.24 1 1 1 1 285 French Catholic
Peru 0.25 0 1 1 1 441 French Catholic
Philippines 0.41 1 1 0 1 380 French Catholic
Poland 0.28 1 1 0 1 1000 German Catholic
Portugal 1.4 1 1 1 1 320 French Catholic
Puerto Rico . 1 1 0 1 270 French Catholic
Romania 0.08 1 1 1 0 335 French Orthodox
Russian Federation 0.16 2 0 0 0 330 Socialist Orthodox
Rwanda 0.1 1 1 1 0 395 French Catholic
Saudi Arabia 0.56 3 1 1 0 360 English Muslim
Senegal 0.19 0 1 1 0 485 French Muslim
Serbia and Montenegro . 2 1 1 0 1028 German Orthodox
Sierra Leone 0.03 2 0 0 0 305 English Muslim
Singapore 1.17 3 1 0 1 69 English Buddhist
Slovak Republic 0.43 2 1 1 0 565 German Catholic
Slovenia 0.38 3 1 1 0 1003 German Catholic
South Africa 0.76 3 1 0 1 277 English Protestant
Spain 1.06 2 1 1 1 169 French Catholic
Sri Lanka 0.29 2 1 0 1 440 English Buddhist
Sweden 0.72 1 1 0 1 208 Nordic Protestant
Switzerland 1.64 1 1 0 1 170 German Catholic
Syrian Arab Republic 0.09 3 0 0 0 672 French Muslim
Taiwan, China 0.99 2 1 1 1 210 German Buddhist
Tanzania 0.06 2 0 0 0 242 English Muslim
Thailand 1 2 1 0 1 390 English Buddhist
Togo 0.16 0 1 1 0 535 French Indigenous
Tunisia 0.67 0 1 1 0 27 French Muslim
Turkey 0.2 2 1 1 1 330 French Muslim
Uganda 0.05 2 0 0 0 209 English Catholic
Ukraine 0.15 2 0 0 0 269 Socialist Orthodox
United Arab Emirates 0.52 2 1 1 0 614 English Muslim
United Kingdom 1.36 4 1 0 1 288 English Protestant
United States 1.46 1 1 0 1 250 English Protestant
Uruguay 0.53 3 1 1 1 620 French Catholic
Uzbekistan . 2 0 0 0 368 Socialist Muslim
Venezuela, RB 0.11 3 1 1 0 445 French Catholic
Vietnam 0.39 1 1 1 0 404 French Buddhist
Yemen, Rep. 0.06 0 1 1 0 360 English Muslim
Zambia 0.07 1 0 0 0 274 English Protestant
Zimbabwe 0.28 4 0 0 0 350 English Protestant
Appendix A:  Data (cont.)Country
Year of 
reform Change in Creditor Rights
Austria 1982 -1
Denmark 1984 1




























Russian Federation 2004 1
Spain 2004 1
Appendix B: Reforms to Creditor Rights 
Index
This table lists the 32 changes in the variable Creditor Rights during 
the 1978-2004 period.Country Reforms 1978-2004 Country Reforms 1978-2004 Country Reforms 1978-2004
Albania 1992, 1995, 1996, 2002 Guinea 1992, 1998 Papua New Guinea none
Algeria none Haiti none Paraguay none
Angola none Honduras none Peru 1992, 1996, 1999, 2002
Argentina 1995, 2002 Hong Kong, China none Philippines 2000
Armenia 1995, 2003 Hungary 1986, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000 Poland 1990, 2003
Australia 1989, 1991, 1992, 2001 India 1985, 1986, 1993, 2002 Portugal 1986, 1993, 1998, 2004
Austria 1982 Indonesia 1998 Puerto Rico 1978, 1994
Azerbaijan 1994, 1997 Iran none Romania 1990, 1995, 2004
Bangladesh 1997 Ireland 1990, 1999, 2001 Russian Federation 1992, 1998, 2002, 2004
Belarus 1991, 2001, Israel 1995, 1999, 2002 Rwanda none
Belgium 1997, 2002 Italy 1979, 1999, 2003 Saudi Arabia 1996
Benin 1998 Jamaica none Senegal 1984, 1998
Bolivia 2003 Japan 2000, 2002 Serbia and Montenegro 1989, 1993, 1996
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1989, 1994, 1998, 2003 Jordan none Sierra Leone none
Botswana 1981 Kazakhstan 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001 Singapore 1994, 1995
Brazil 2004 Kenya none Slovak Republic 1991, 1993, 1998, 2000
Bulgaria 1989, 1994, 2000, 2003 Korea, Rep. 1991, 1998 Slovenia 1994, 1997
Burkina Faso 1991, 1998 Kuwait 1980 South Africa 1984, 1998
Burundi none Kyrgyz Republic 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002 Spain 2004
Cambodia none Lao PDR 1994 Sri Lanka 1982
Cameroon 1998 Latvia 1991, 1996, 2002 Sweden 1979, 1987, 1996, 2003
Canada 1992, 1997 Lebanon none Switzerland 1994
Central African Republic 1998 Lesotho none Syrian Arab Republic none
Chad 1998 Lithuania 1992, 1995, 1997, 2001 Taiwan, China 1980
Chile 1982 Macedonia 1989, 1997 Tanzania none
China 1986, 1991 Madagascar none Thailand 1998, 1999
Colombia 1989, 1995, 1999 Malawi 1984, 2000 Togo 1988, 1998
Congo, Dem. Rep. none Malaysia 1998, 2000 Tunisia 1995, 1999, 2003
Congo, Rep. 1998 Mali 1986, 1992, 1998 Turkey 2003, 2004
Costa Rica 1989, 1996 Mauritania 2000 Uganda none
Cote d'Ivoire 1998 Mexico 2000 Ukraine 1992, 1999, 2002
Croatia 1989, 1994, 1997, 2000 Moldova 1992, 1996, 2001 United Arab Emirates 1984, 1993
Czech Republic 1991 Mongolia 1991, 1997 United Kingdom 1985, 1986, 2000, 2002
Denmark 1984 Morocco 1996 United States 1978, 1994
Dominican Republic none Mozambique none Uruguay 2001
Ecuador 1997 Namibia none Uzbekistan 1994, 1998, 2003
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1999 Nepal none Venezuela none
El Salvador none Netherlands 1992 Vietnam 1993
Ethiopia none New Zealand 1993 Yemen, Rep. 1991, 1998
Finland 1985, 1991, 1993, 1995 Nicaragua none Zambia 1994
France 1984, 1985, 1994 Niger 1997, 1998 Zimbabwe 1998
Georgia 1996, 2001 Nigeria 1990
Germany 1994, 1999 Norway 1984
Ghana none Oman 1990
Greece 1983, 1990 Pakistan 1984
Guatemala none Panama none
This table lists the 162 reforms in bankruptcy laws in 99 countries, during the 1978-2004 period.
Appendix C: Reforms In Bankruptcy Laws